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Counterfactual thinking (CFT) involves the mental simulation of alternatives to the past. In 
contrast, prefactual thinking (PFT) simulates potential outcomes that have yet to happen. 
Individuals differ in the extent to which they think in these ways, but we know little about 
how personality is implicated in these differences. This study investigated the relationship 
between Big Five personality traits and levels of spontaneous CFT and PFT embedded within 
a fictional diary entry. Results indicated that CFT was related to high neuroticism and low 
agreeableness, while PFT was related to low neuroticism and high agreeableness, as well as 
high extraversion.  This suggests that CFT and PFT are, in part, dispositionally based and 
may be predicted by Big Five measures. This has implications for our understanding of 
individual differences in terms of the functionality of CFT and PFT and their potential 
influence on life outcomes. 
 
















 Individuals often allow their thoughts to drift from the present moment to the past and 
the future. When they reflect on the past, they not only recall things that happened but may 
imagine how they could have happened differently. This imagination of alternatives to reality 
is known as counterfactual thinking (CFT). CFT often takes the form of “if only …” thoughts 
about what might have been, for instance, a student might imagine “if only I had studied 
harder, I could have passed my exams”. Similarly, people reflect on the future, known as 
prefactual thinking (PFT), imagining different possible outcomes, for instance “if I work hard 
for my exam next month, I will pass” where there is a causal link between an antecedent and 
consequent (Epstude, Scholl & Roese, 2016). These types of thought can impact on our 
wellbeing and ongoing behaviour. There is evidence of individual differences in the 
propensity for individuals to spontaneously engage in counterfactual thinking (Bacon, et al, 
2013) and Markman and Miller (2006) have shown counterfactuals may serve different 
functions for different people. However, although we know these differences exist, we 
currently know little about what might determine them.  The present study is concerned with 
whether individual differences in the Big Five personality traits (Neuroticism, Extraversion, 
Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness) can account for the 
tendency towards thinking counterfactually and/or prefactually.  
Mental simulation occurs automatically and is a pervasive feature of human thought 
(Byrne, 2016). Although simulating the future and past may share similar processes 
(Schacter, Benoit, DeBrigard & Spuznar, 2015) they can have different consequences (De 
Brigard, Szpunar & Schacter, 2013) and functions (Ferrante, Girotto, Straga & Walsh, 2013).  
Simulating future possibilities plays a key role in planning and goal-setting (Epstude et al., 
2016) by allowing individuals to consider the consequences of different actions and events. 





CFT has also been linked to future planning (Epstude & Roese, 2008) but compared to future 
thoughts, it is more likely to focus on uncontrollable events (Ferrante et al. 2013; Mercier et 
al., 2017) and in doing so, may also allow individuals to excuse past failures (Byrne, 2016). 
The CFT that is most functional is that which is self-focussed and which concerns how events 
might have turned out better (termed upwards CFT). Actions simulated in such thoughts are 
inherently controllable and retrospective control perceptions can enhance functions such as 
adaptive preparation, anticipatory planning and behaviour change (Epstude & Roese, 2008; 
Roese and Morrison, 2009; Nasco & Marsh, 1999). 
Counterfactual and prefactual thinking may also have different consequences for 
affect. When people imagine alternatives to the past, they often compare what happened to 
what might have been.  Thinking about how past events could have been better can therefore 
lead people to feel worse about how things are (Roese, 1997). This has been associated with 
negative emotions generally (Bacon, Walsh & Martin, 2013) and specifically feelings such as 
regret (Roese & Summerville, 2005; Seta and Seta, 2013), blame (Alicke, Buckingham, Zell 
& Davis, 2008), guilt and shame (Niedenthal, Tangney & Gavanski, 1994), potentially 
impacting on how well people cope with traumatic events (Davis & Lehman, 1995; Bhushan 
& Kumar, 2012). Importantly, these relationships hold even after controlling for more general 
ruminations about the past suggesting that the tendency to engage in CFT is independent of 
rumination and has important consequences. CFT can also be triggered by low mood (Roese 
& Hur, 1997) and hence a self-perpetuating cycle of CFT and low mood may result (Roese et 
al., 2009). In contrast, when people think ahead, they can imagine a future that is still 
possible. Probably for this reason, imagining a better future is more likely to lead to positive 
mood (Epstude et al., 2016; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen & Singer, 2013).  
Little research to date has focussed on individual differences in the tendency to think 
counterfactually or prefactually. Understanding these differences in important given their 





potential impact on behaviour and mood. In the present study we focus on the Big Five traits, 
arguably the most widely researched model of personality, yet we know little about the 
influence of the five traits on CFT and no research has previously considered them in the 
context of PFT. One early study (Kasimatis & Wells, 1995) found no significant association 
between CFT and any of the Big Five. However, they did observe positive associations 
between CFT and low self-esteem, negative affectivity and depression. It is therefore 
surprising that they report no association with neuroticism, a trait typified by negative 
emotions such as these. The Big Five model proposes that each trait is underpinned by six 
subfacets (specific aspects) and that analyses which include scores on these can provide a 
more fine-grained picture of an individual’s trait profile. Our present study extends that of 
Kasimatis & Wells (1995) by including the Big Five subfacets in our analysis in addition to 
the main superordinate trait scores.  
There is virtually no research into individual differences in the tendency to prefactual 
thought, and what exists is equivocal. Sanna (1998) suggested that optimists have a greater 
tendency to think retrospectively about how things could have been worse, while defensive 
pessimists tend to look to the future, but expect the worst (Sanna, 1998). Conversely 
however, Smallwood and O’Connor (2011) have shown that a negative mood induction 
increases thinking about the past, whereas a positive mood induction increased thinking to the 
future. One study has attempted to examine the relationship between Big Five traits and 
general forms of thinking in the past, present or future (Fortunato & Furey, 2009). In that 
study, future thinking correlated positively with extraversion and openness, whereas past 
thinking correlated positively with neuroticism and negatively with extraversion. The latter 
results were explained by the general association between extraversion and cheerfulness and 
positive mood. However, this study used an entirely psychometric method, asking 
participants to complete a self-report questionnaire on the type of thinking they tend to 





employ, and past and future thinking were not operationally defined. In the present study, we 
specifically examine counterfactual and prefactual thinking using a CFT research paradigm 
which collects data on participants’ spontaneous thoughts in relation to a given event (Bacon 
et al., 2013; Briazu et al., 2017; McEleney & Byrne, 2006). To date, there is only one study 
of individual differences using this method (Bacon et al, 2013) which further indicated that 
CFT was associated with negative emotions. 
Overall, there is consistent evidence that CFT is associated with low mood and 
Fortunato and Furey (2009) reported that thinking about the past is negatively related to 
Extraversion (a trait generally typified by positive attitudes and mood, Costa & McCrae, 
2006), and positively associated with Neuroticism. Individuals high in neuroticism tend to 
experience negative affect such as sadness, anxiety and depression, as well as fear, 
embarrassment, anger and disgust (Costa & McCrae, 2006; Widiger, 2009). These can result 
in poor coping, impulsivity and a range of negative life outcomes (Lahey, 2009). As such, 
although Kasimatis and Wells (1995) reported no relationship between CFT and trait 
neuroticism, we proposed that association may be observed if the subfacets of this trait 
(particularly depression, anxiety and angry-hostility) are examined. Conversely, individuals 
who think ahead and plan for better future outcomes are assumed to be those with generally 
more positive and goal-oriented dispositions. Accordingly, Fortunato and Furey (2009) 
reported positive associations between thinking about the future and both Extraversion and 
Openness to experience, a trait associated with interest in new experiences and ideas (Costa 
& McCrae, 2006). We made the following á priori predictions: 
Prediction 1: CFT will be positively associated with Neuroticism subfacets depression, 
anxiety and angry-hostility.  
Prediction 2: CFT will be negatively associated with Extraversion 
Prediction 3: PFT will be negatively associated with Neuroticism.  





Prediction 4: PFT will be positively associated with Extraversion 
Prediction 5: PFT will be positively associated with Openness to Experience 
 
We also examined individual sub-facets of each traits but made no specific predictions 
about these at this point.  
Methods 
 Participants 
A volunteer sample of 319 undergraduate students (241 female; mean age 20.48 
years, SD = 4.24) participated in small groups. All were native English speakers and self-
declared as not having been clinically diagnosed with any form of psychological disorder. 
 
 Measures and Procedures 
All participants completed two measures: 
Counterfactual/prefactual thinking: Participants read a scenario about moving house to a new 
job in a new city (from McEleney & Byrne, 2006; Bacon et al, 2013). The scenario described 
the decisions the protagonist made and various situations which occurred in the first few 
weeks after the move which resulted in feelings of loneliness and difficulty settling. 
Participants were asked to think about the scenario and imagine how they might think and 
feel were they the protagonist. They were then given 5 minutes to write a free narrative of 
their thoughts and feelings in the style of a personal diary entry. We counted the number of 
counterfactuals and prefactuals generated in each narrative. A counterfactual was defined as 
any thought about how a change to the scenario would change the outcome (McEleney & 
Byrne, 2006; for instance, ‘‘If only I had gone to that party, I would have made friends”) and 
a prefactual as a simulation of what the participant would do differently net time base on the 





antecedent in the scenario, e.g. If I’m invited to another party, I will go.  Two raters 
independently examined the diary narratives and assessed the number of counterfactuals and 
prefactuals present in each case. Initial agreement was 88% with the few discrepant cases 
resolved through discussion. Although the mean number of counterfactual or prefactual 
thoughts generated by participants in this task is typically quite low (typically between 0 and 
4; McEleney & Byrne, 2006, Bacon et al., 2013), it is a useful way to examine the general 
extent to which people tend to think spontaneously and naturally. Given the negative 
outcome, the majority of the counterfactuals generated tend to be of the upwards form (i.e. 
imagining how things might have been better) and self-referent (i.e. If only I had/had not…). 
These are generally considered to be the most functional thoughts as they infer controllability 
of action and a measure of these is therefore ideal for the present purposes. A copy of the 
scenario and instructions is presented in the appendix.  
The NEO-PI-R UK edition (Costa & McCrae, 2006) presents 240 self-report items 
each rated on a five-point Likert scale from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). The 
measure yields scores for each of the Big Five superordinate traits and for each of the six sub-
facet underpinning each trait. The current data showed good internal consistency for each of 
the superordinate scales: Neuroticism α = .91, Extraversion α = .86, Openness α = .84, 
Agreeableness α = .84, Conscientiousness α = .93.  
 
Results 
 The mean number of spontaneous counterfactuals observed was 1.23 (SD = 1.06) and 
the mean number of prefactual thoughts was .73 (SD = 1.10).   CFT and PFT were not 
significantly associated (r = .03, p = .56). Table 1 presents correlations between these 
measures, the Big Five superordinate traits and their sub-facets.  
 









Neuroticism .14* -.15* 
Extraversion .05 .15* 
Openness .01 .04 
Agreeableness -.15* .13* 
Conscientiousness .02 .06 
     
N1 Anxiety .15* -.10 
N2 Angry hostility .21* -.11* 
N3 Depression .05 -.13* 
N4 Self-consciousness .09 -.12* 
N5 Impulsiveness .04 -.10 
N6 Vulnerability .09 -.12* 
   
E1 Warmth -.01 .16* 
E2 Gregariousness .03 .08 
E3 Assertiveness .10 .12* 
E4 Activity .09 .07 
E5 Excitement seeking -.02 .09 
E6 Positive emotions .03 .13* 
   
O1 Fantasy .10* .002 
O2 Aesthetics -.06 .003 
O3 Feelings .04 -.03 
O4 Actions -.03 .05 
O5 Ideas -.01 .06 
O6 Values .04 .08 
     
A1 Trust -.15* .06 
A2 Straightforwardness -.17* .16* 
A3 Altruism -.02 .12* 
A4 Compliance -.08 .07 
A5 Modesty -.02 .06 
A6 Tender-mindedness -.11* .02 
     
C1 Competence .04 .06 
C2 Order .01 -.002 
C3 Dutifulness -.03 .02 
C4 Achievement striving .05 .02 
C5 Self-discipline -.01 .07 
C6 Deliberation -.08 .04 
 
In terms of the superordinate traits, neither CFT nor PFT showed any significant associations 
with either openness or conscientiousness. As predicted however, CFT was positively, and 





PFT negatively associated with Neuroticism. In addition, we observed a positive correlation 
between extraversion and PFT, but not CFT. Both forms of thinking were associated with 
agreeableness, for CFT the relationship was negative, while for PFT it was positive. In terms 
of the facet correlations in Table 1, we can see that CFT is positively associated with N1 and 
N2 (anxiety and anger respectively) whilst PFT shows negative associations with all 
neuroticism facets except N1 (anxiety) and N5 (impulsiveness) where the association does 
not reach significance.  For agreeableness, Table 2 indicates negative associations between 
CFT and A1 (trust), A2 (straightforwardness) and A6 tender-mindedness), while PFT shows 
positive associations between agreeableness facets A2 (straightforwardness) and A3 
(altruism). PFT also presents a positive correlations with Extraversion facets E1 (warmth), E3 
(assertiveness) and E6 (positive emotions).   
The results of regression analyses are shown in Table 2. We first examined the effects 
of the Big Five superordinate traits on CFT and PFT in turn. These accounted for 3% 
variance in CFT and 5% in PFT. In both cases, significant independent effects of 
Agreeableness were indicated, a negative effect on CFT and a positive one for PFT. A 
positive effect of neuroticism on CFT was observed, and a negative effect on PFT. 
Extraversion shared variance with PFT but showed no effects on CFT. We conducted further 
regressions with the thirty individual facet scores. In this case, due to the relatively large 
number of independent variables, we used a forward stepwise method and the results are also 
shown in Table 2. Variance in CFT was accounted for by facets N2 (anger; positive) and A2 
(straightforwardness; negative). In PFT, variance was explained by three facets, E1 (warmth; 
positive), N3 (depression; negative) and A2 (straightforwardness; positive).   
 





Table 2. Results of regression analyses on CFT and PFT. In each case, analysis one tests 




The present study is the first to examine the Big Five personality traits as potential 
explanations for individual differences in the tendency towards both counterfactual thinking 
and prefactual thinking. In sum, our results suggest that contrasting levels of neuroticism and 
agreeableness can differentiate between a tendency towards one or other form of thought.  
PFT was also associated with higher levels of extraversion.  
Neuroticism was positively associated with levels of CFT, but negatively with PFT. 
This falls in line with our predictions and with previous research which has shown that CFT 
     95% Confidence interval  
  St. β t p lower upper Adj. R2 
 
Counterfactual thinking 




N .19 3.14 .002 .003 .01 
 
 E .11 1.74 .08 -.001 .01  
 O .001 .02 .98 -.01 .01  
 A -.15 -2.72 .01 -.02 -.003  
 C .11 1.89 .06 -.002 .01 .04 
        
2 N2 .18 3.32 .001 .01 .05  
 A2 -.15 -2.65 .01 -.05 -.01 .06 
        
 
Prefactual thinking 




N -.11 -1.70 .09 -.01 .001 
 
 E .11 1.84 .07 -.003 .01  
 O -.001 -.02 .99 -.01 .01  
 A .12 2.09 .03 -.004 .01  
 C -.003 -.04 .97 -.01 .01 .03 
        
2 N3 .12 2.09 .04 .002 .06  
 E1 .15 2.75 .01 .01 .06  
 A2 -.13 -2.25 .03 -.04 -.003 .05 





is related to low mood states and PFT with more positive ones. Examination of the facet 
scores allowed for a more fine-grained analysis. This revealed that scores on facets N1 
(anxiety) and N2 (angry hostility) were both associated with higher levels of CFT though 
only the latter explained variance in CFT independently of the other facets. This facet (N2, 
angry-hostility) refers to the tendency to experience anger and hostility but also related states 
such as bitterness and frustration. We can imagine how looking back at a negative outcome 
might trigger such feelings. Individuals high in neuroticism are motivated to avoid potential 
threats, and other research has shown that people with a high level of prevention focus (risk-
averse and maintain the status quo in order to remain safe) focus on past experiences, rather 
than thinking about future goals (e.g. Higgins, 1998). This further supports the idea that 
negative emotionality is closely associated with dwelling on the past. Moreover, there is 
evidence that counterfactual related regret for actions taken can trigger what have been 
termed “hot emotions”, including anger, frustration, embarrassment (Gilovich, Medvec & 
Kahneman, 1998; Kedia & Hilton, 2011). In addition, individuals who score highly on N2 
(angry-hostility) tend to be lower in agreeableness (Costa & McCrae, 2006) which was also 
associated with CFT in the present data. Overall, the link between Neuroticism and CFT is 
more complex than a mutual association with negative affect and, given the poor life 
outcomes associated with neuroticism, is worthy of further study. It may be that excessive 
counterfactual thinking, together with associated rumination, may help to explain the 
mechanisms by which neuroticism and outcomes are linked. 
The finding that low agreeableness was associated with a higher rate of CFT is an 
interesting result that we had not predicted.  Costa and McCrae (2006) describe agreeableness 
as a dimension of interpersonal tendencies whereby high scores indicate altruism and a 
positive view of human nature (though also possible overdependency and gullibility) while 
low scores reflect antagonism, cynicism and a tendency towards competition rather than 





cooperation, fitting given the established association between CFT and negative mood. 
Examination of the agreeableness facet data revealed that CFT was negatively correlated with 
facets A1 (trust), A2 (straightforwardness) and A6 (tender-mindedness), though only A2, 
shared a significant amount of independent variance with CFT in regression, reflecting a lack 
of straightforwardness in dealings with others, a willingness to be manipulative and 
disingenuous.  Interestingly, recent research by Briazu, Walsh, Ganis and Deeprose (2017) 
has shown that individuals with a tendency to lie also seem to generate more counterfactual 
thoughts. Like counterfactual thinking, some forms of lying require imagination of an 
alternative to past events.  In direct contrast, agreeableness scores were positively associated 
with PFT. 
In addition, PFT was positively associated with extraversion as predicted.  Extraverts 
are sociable, outgoing and talkative, they like excitement and stimulation and tend to be 
optimistic and cheerful. The facet-level correlations indicated this effect was driven by facets 
E1 (warmth), E2 (gregariousness), E3 (assertiveness) and E6 (positive emotions). However, 
only E1 (warmth) was shown to share independent variance with PFT in our regression 
analysis. We also anticipated that PFT would be related to openness to experience and the 
possibility of a range of potential future outcomes. Our results here suggest these 
characteristics are more typical of those captured by the trait of extraversion, rather than 
openness to experience as we had originally anticipated.   
In terms of the positive associations between CFT and neuroticism and between PFT 
and extraversion our results reflect those of Fortunato & Furey’s (2009) psychometric study. 
Their other finding, that openness is related to future thinking was not observed. However, 
their thinking questionnaire included items such as "People think of me as a visionary” and “I 
am known for invention/innovation”. These items may reflect creativity as much as past or 
future thinking and, given that creativity and intellectual curiosity are intrinsic to openness, it 





is perhaps unsurprising the two were related in that study.  We did not predict a link between 
Openness and CFT, and did not observe one in terms of the superordinate trait. However, we 
did observe a modest, though significant, positive association between facet O1 (openness to 
fantasy) and CFT. In retrospect however this might have been predicted given that Bacon et 
al (2013) reported an association between CFT (using the same measure) and fantasy 
proneness, a trait associated with an active fantasy life and imagination. In addition, the 
cognitive need for closure is found to be negatively associated with thinking of alternative 
outcomes to events (Hirt, Kardes & Markman, 2004) and also with Openness (Stalder, 2007). 
This evidence only suggests indirect evidence for a CFT-openness association, however may 
be worthy of further study. Stalder (2007) highlights how need-for-closure can be 
differentiated into two subfactors which inversely correlate with Openness. How these factors 
are associated with CFT and PFT might form a useful focus for further research.   
The one trait which did not feature at all in our analysis was Conscientiousness. 
Previous work has not suggested any link between this and CFT or PFT, though we might 
hypothesise that conscientious individuals (those who are organised, determined and strive to 
achieve) may wish to learn from past mistakes and set goals for future improvement. 
However, neither superordinate trait scores, not those for any of the subfacets of 
conscientiousness showed any relationship with the tendency towards CFT or PFT. Again, a 
more fine-grained analysis than is possible here may reveal some useful associations.   
In the above analysis we have tended to assume that personality drives thinking and, 
because our data is correlational, we need to consider potential inverse effects. Whilst the Big 
Five traits are generally considered to be fairly inherent, it may be possible that CFT or PFT 
can precede emotions that we associate with certain traits. For instance, it has been suggested 
that CFT can trigger negative moods, such as when thoughts about how things might have 
turned out better generate high levels of regret (Roese, Park, Smallman, & Gibson, 2008; 





Roese & Morrison, 2009). Roese et al. (2008) state that the correlational nature of their data 
precludes a definitive assignment of causation and that CFT may be part of a cyclical process 
of negative affect and problem-focused cognition (Roese et al., 2008). As noted earlier, 
thinking about the future has also been shown to precede positive mood, even if thoughts are 
themselves negative (Ruby et al., 2013). Nevertheless, our findings are novel and informative 
and suggest some fundamental individual differences in how personality may impact across 
the two forms of thinking. Exactly how specific traits function in this way will be a useful 
focus of for future research.    
Finally, our findings may have implications for the functional theory of CFT. For 
instance, retrospective control perceptions can enhance functions such as adaptive 
preparation, anticipatory planning and behaviour change (Epstude & Roese, 2008; Roese and 
Morrison, 2009; Nasco & Marsh, 1999) and both control perceptions and positive imagery 
are known to be protective of mental health and helpful in coping after stressful events 
(Taylor, Kemeny, Reed, Bower & Gruenewald, 2000). Markman & Miller (2006) showed 
that CFT depleted perceptions of outcome control in depressed patients, suggesting that CFT 
may be less functional with increasing depressive symptomology. Potentially, this may be 
also be the case with high Neuroticism and present further motivation for research such as 
this into the role of personality traits. Future research might usefully explore more 
specifically the ways in which Neuroticism and agreeableness impact on functional 
counterfactual outcomes.  
Our findings raise the question as to why Kasimatis and Wells (1995) reported no 
significant associations between the Big Five and counterfactual thinking. They reported 
upwards counterfactuals (those we focus on here) as well as downward counterfactuals (those 
where people simulate worse potential outcomes), however used different methodology in 
that they included scenarios with positive and neutral as well as negative outcomes. They 





state that the tendency to think counterfactually was consistent across time and scenario type 
(i.e. people who generate a lot of counterfactuals in one scenario, also do in others) and report 
data reflecting only this general tendency, rather than for the different scenario types. It is 
probable that averaging the number of counterfactuals generated across all scenarios may 
have masked some effects. Furthermore, they do not discuss subfacets of the Big Five traits.  
A future study could examine the relationship between the Big Five, their subfacets and both 
counterfactuals and prefactuals generated across scenarios with different outcomes.  
The study is not without some limitations, particularly the use of a single scenario 
with a negative outcome, which does not readily allow for the examination of downwards 
counterfactuals or the content of those counterfactual or prefactual thoughts. However, we 
wanted to directly compare the tendency towards CFT and PFT and the latter does not tend to 
be observed in a downwards form – people don’t plan ahead for worse outcomes. 
Nevertheless, we recognise the need for further studies to extend this line of enquiry and we 
have suggested some in this discussion. A related point is that according to the functional 
approach, CFT as well as PFT works to prepare people for future events (Epstude & Roese, 
2008; Smallman & Roese, 2009) and as such we would expect an association between CFT 
and PFT which was not observed in the present study. It is likely that such an association 
would be observed were we to study the overlapping content of counterfactual and prefactual 
thoughts and whether the Big Five traits mediate the relationship. The content of 
counterfactuals has been found to vary between focus on past and future, for instance Choi 
and Markman (2018) showed that reflection on events from the perspective of understanding 
the past (versus preparing for the future) tended to elicit more subtractive CFT (I wish I had 
not…) than additive CFT (I wish I had…). These trends might also vary between individuals 
as a function of personality traits. Our scenario does not provide rich enough data for such an 





analysis and we recommend that future studies incorporate methods which capture more 
detail of the focus and direction of thoughts generated.  
In conclusion, this is the first study to identify a clear relationship between CFT, PFT 
and Big Five traits. Given the ubiquity of the Big Five in individual differences research, 
understanding their correlates is important for the ongoing development of personality theory. 
Moreover, neuroticism is known to predict an array of negative life outcomes for health and 
wellbeing (Lahey, 2009; Widiger, 2009). CFT in particular may be one of the mechanisms 
which influence these outcomes and further work to examine this possibility is desirable. 
That PFT is associated with consistent personality traits characterised by positive mood and 
interpersonal tendencies is an important new finding and one which might usefully inform 
interventions to change unfavourable cognitions and develop more positive methods of 

































Alicke, M.D., Buckingham, J., Zell, E. & Davis, T. (2008). Culpable control and 
counterfactual reasoning in the psychology of blame. Personality & Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 34, 1371-1381. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167208321594  
Bacon, A.M., Walsh, C.R. & Martin, L. (2013). Fantasy proneness and counterfactual 
thinking. Personality & Individual Differences, 54, 469-473. DOI 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2012.09.023  
Bhushan B. & Kumar JS. (2012). A study of posttraumatic stress and growth in tsunami relief 
volunteers. Journal of Loss and Trauma, 17, 113–24. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/15325024.2011.635580 
Briazu, R.A., Walsh, C.R., Deeprose, C. & Ganis, G. (2017). Undoing the past in order to lie 
in the present: Counterfactual thinking and deceptive communication. Cognition 161, 
66-73. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.01.003  
Byrne, R.M.J. (2016). Counterfactual Thought. Annual Review of Psychology, 67, 135-157. 
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-122414-033249  
Choi, H. & Markman, K.D. (2018). “If only I had” versus “If only I had not”: Mental 
deletions, mental additions, and perceptions of meaning in life events. The Journal of 
Positive Psychology, 14, 672-680. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2018.1545040  
Costa, P. T. & McCrae, R.R. (2006). Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO PI –R) 
Manual (UK Edition). Oxford: Hogrefe. 
Davis, C.G. & Lehman, D.R. (1995). Counterfactual thinking and coping with traumatic life 
events.  In Roese, N.J. & Olson, J.M. (Eds). What might have been: The social 
psychology of counterfactual thinking (pp. 353-374). Hillsdale, NJ,: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 





De Brigard, F., Szpunar, K. K., & Schacter, D. L. (2013). Coming to grips with the past: 
Effects of repeated simulation on the perceived plausibility of episodic counterfactual 
thoughts. Psychological Science, 24, 1329–1334. DOI 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797612468163  
Epstude, K. & Roese, N.J. (2008). The functional theory of counterfactual thinking. 
Personality & Social Psychology Review, 12,168–192. DOI 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1088868308316091  
Epstude, K., Scholl, A., & Roese, N. J. (2016). Prefactual thoughts: Mental simulations about 
what might happen. Review of General Psychology, 20, 48-56. DOI: 
10.1037/gpr0000064 
Ferrante, D., Girotto, V., Straga, M., & Walsh, C. R. (2013). Improving the past and the 
future: A temporal asymmetry in hypothetical thinking. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 142, 23–27. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0027947  
Fortunato, V.T. & Furey, J.T. (209). The Theory of MindTime and the relationships between 
thinking perspective and the Big Five personality traits. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 47, 241-246. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2009.03.006  
Gilovich, T., Medvecch, V. H., & Kahneman, D. (1998). Varieties of regret: A debate and 
partial resolution. Psychological Review, 105, 602−605. DOI 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.105.3.602  
Higgins, E.T. (1998). Promotion and prevention: regularity focus as a motivational principle. 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 30, 1-46. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60381-0  
Hirt, E.R., Kardes, F.R. & Markman, K.D. (2004). Activating a mental simulation mind-set 
through generation of alternatives: Implications for debiasing in related and unrelated 





domains. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40, 374–383. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2003.07.009  
Kasimatis, M. & Wells, G.L. (1995). Individual differences in counterfactual thinking. In N. 
J. Roese & J. M. Olson (Eds.), What Might Have Been: The Social Psychology of 
Counterfactual Thinking (pp. 81 – 101). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Kedia, G. & Hilton, D.J. (2011). Hot as hell! The self-conscious nature of action regrets. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47, 490 – 493. DOI 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2010.10.017  
Lahey, B.B. (2009). Public health significance of neuroticism. American Psychologist, 64, 
241–256. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0015309  
Markman, K. D., & Miller, A. K. (2006). Depression, control, and counterfactual thinking: 
Functional for whom? Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 25, 210–227. DOI 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1521/jscp.2006.25.2.210  
McEleney, A. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2006). Spontaneous counterfactual thoughts and causal 
explanations. Thinking & Reasoning, 12, 235 – 255. DOI 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546780500317897  
Mercier, H., Rolison, J.J., Stragà, M., Ferrante, D., Walsh, C.R. & Girotto, V. (2017). 
Questioning the preparatory function of counterfactual thinking. Memory and Cognition, 
45, 261-269. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-016-0660-5  
Nasco, S. A., & Marsh, K. L. (1999). Gaining control through counterfactual thinking. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 556-568. DOI 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167299025005002  
Niedenthal, P. M., Tangney, J. P. & Gavanski, I. (1994).  ‘If only I weren’t’ versus ‘If only I 
hadn’t’ : Distinguishing shame from guilt in counterfactual thinking.  Journal of 





Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 585-95. DOI 
https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/0022-3514.67.4.585  
Roese, N.J. (1997). Counterfactual thinking. Psychological Bulletin, 121,133-148. DOI 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.121.1.133  
Roese, N.J. & Hur, T. (1997). Affective determinants of counterfactual thinking. Social 
Cognition, 15, 274-290. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1521/soco.1997.15.4.274  
Roese, N.J. & Summerville, A. (2005). What we regret most … and why. Personality & 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 31,1273–1285. DOI 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167205274693  
Roese, N. J., Park, S., Smallman, R., & Gibson, C. (2008). Schizophrenia involves 
impairment in the activation of intentions by counterfactual thinking. Schizophrenia 
Research, 103, 343–344. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2007.05.006  
Roese, N.J. & Morrison, M. (2009). The psychology of counterfactual thinking. Historical 
Social Research, 34,16-26.  
Roese, N.J., Epstude, K., Fessel, F., Morrison, M., Smallman, R., Summerville, A., Galinsky, 
A.D. & Segerstrom, S. (2009). Repetitive regret, depression, and anxiety: Findings from 
a nationally representative survey. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 28, 671-
688. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1521/jscp.2009.28.6.671  
Ruby, F.J., Smallwood, J., Engen, H. & Singer, T. (2013). How self-generated thought shapes 
mood--the relation between mind-wandering and mood depends on the socio-temporal 
content of thoughts. PLoS One.8. DOI  http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.007755  
Sanna, L.J. (1998). Defensive pessimism and optimism: The bitter-sweet influence of mood 
on performance and prefactual and counterfactual thinking. Cognition & Emotion, 12, 
635-665. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699939837944   





Schacter, D.L., Benoit, R.G., DeBrigard, F. & Spuznar, K.K. (2015). Episodic future thinking 
and episodic counterfactual thinking: Intersections between memory and decisions. 
Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, 117, 14-21. DOI 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.nlm.2013.12.008  
Seta, C.E. & Seta, J.J. (2013).  Regret in pursuit of change and maintenance goals. Motivation 
and Emotion, 37,177-184. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11031-012-9283-8  
Smallman, R. & Roese, N.J. (2009). Counterfactual thinking facilitates behavioral intentions. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45,845 – 852. DOI 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2009.03.002  
Smallwood J, O’Connor RC. (2011). Imprisoned by the past: unhappy moods lead to a 
retrospective bias to mind wandering. Cognition and Emotion, 25, 1481–
1490. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2010.545263 
Stalder, D.R. (2007) Need for Closure, the Big Five, and Public Self Consciousness. Journal 
of Social Psychology, 147, 91-94. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3200/SOCP.147.1.91-94  
Taylor, S.E., Kemeny, M.E., Reed, G.M., Bower, J.E. & Gruenewald, T.L. (2000). 
Psychological resources, positive illusions, and health. American Psychologist, 55, 99–
109. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.99  
Widiger, T.A. (2009). Neuroticism. In M.R. Leary & R.H. Hoyle (Eds.). Handbook of 













The scenario and instructions presented to participants. After reading the scenario, 
participants were given 5 minutes to write their diary entry. 
 
Diary Task 
Please read the scenario below and imagine that the events really happened to you. Then 
write about the imagined experience as if you were writing in your diary. Include your 
thoughts and feelings about all the events and the outcome. 
___________________________________________________________________ 
You’re moving house to start a new job in a different city. The night before you leave, you 
write down your feelings about the move in your diary: 
“I’ve got mixed feelings about moving to a place where I hardly know anyone - my 
friends and social life are so important to me. But I’m sure it will be easy to settle into 
the new town – I’ve never had any trouble making new friends.” 
A lot happens in your first two weeks in the new town. During your first week at work, a staff 
dinner is held. You decide to go because you want to get to know your colleagues. You enjoy 
the evening and meet a lot of people. 
That weekend, your next-door neighbours invite you to a party. Most of the people who live 
on your road will be there. However, that evening you decide to go to the cinema instead. 
The next week you decide to ring an old friend who lives in the town and ask him to show 
you around. You arrange to go out with him the following evening and he introduces you to a 
lot of his friends. 
A few days later, a colleague tells you there’s a membership vacancy at her sports club. You 
think joining would be a good way to meet people, but then you decide to spend the money 
on a new stereo instead. 
Six weeks after the move, things have turned out nothing like you had expected. You haven’t 
made any real friends in the new town and you feel very lonely and isolated. You are very 
upset and very surprised.  
 
 
 
 
